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Abstract
This paper is a study of the process by which employers in five relatively low-wage British firms
fill vacancies.  It studies the determinants of the number and quality of applicants, the way in which
these applicants are selected for interviews and offered jobs.  The main conclusions are that the
number of applicants is relatively small,  the monetary and non-monetary aspects of jobs are
important determinants of the number of applicants for jobs, but that firms do eventually fill
virtually all vacancies.  Non-employed job applicants have more difficulty in getting a job
interview than those who are currently employed but, once interviewed, do not appear to face any
further difficulties in getting employment.
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1 Indeed, there are often problems in defining exactly what a vacancy is.  NBER (1966) essentially
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provide.
2  From the work of Gregg and Wadsworth (1996) and Gregory and Jukes (1997) we know that
the unemployed typically go into the sort of jobs we are studying.
Pretty Vacant:
Recruitment in Low-Wage Labour Markets
Alan Manning
Introduction
There is an enormous literature on job search by the unemployed and the duration of spells of
unemployment.  But, rather little is known about the other side of the matching process, the filling
of vacancies.  For example, Devine and Kiefer (1991), in their encyclopaedic review of search
models of the labour market, can only find nine studies of vacancies to discuss as compared to
literally hundreds of studies on unemployment durations and job search by the unemployed.  The
reason for this neglect of vacancies is that detailed information about them is not normally
collected on a systematic basis1.  The few studies there are tend to rely on one-off datasets.  This
paper is no exception.  It uses data collected over a period of three months from five firms
operating in relatively low-wage sectors of the British economy.  
Most existing studies of vacancies focus either on the outcome of the recruitment process
measured as vacancy durations (eg Beaumont, 1978; Roper, 1988; van Ours, 1989; van Ours and
Ridder, 1992, 1993), vacancy rates (Holzer, 1994) or the inputs into the recruitment process by
employers (Barron and Bishop, 1985; Barron, Bishop and Dunkelberg, 1985).  In contrast, the
emphasis in this paper is on the process by which vacancies are filled. It examines the
determinants of the number and quality of job applicants, the number of interviews and offers
made.  The paper also analyses the way in which employers select workers from among the pool
of job applicants.  There are a few papers which consider some of these issues (eg van Ours and
Ridder, 1993, on the determinants of the number of job applicants) but, for the most part, there is
little existing econometric evidence on the issues we model here.  There are two main areas in
which we might hope to improve our understanding of labour markets by such a study of the
recruitment process.
First, we should be able to shed some light on the nature of the employment ‘problem’ in
low-wage labour markets and, hence, to get some idea of the likely effectiveness of some recent
government policy initiatives2.  For example, if unemployment is largely involuntary (perhaps
because of efficiency wage effects) then we might expect to see large queues of workers for our
jobs even though these are jobs at or near the bottom end of the labour market.  In this case,
policies to price workers back into employment might be most effective.  On the other hand, if
vacancies have rather few applicants this suggests that it is the supply of workers that is the
constraint on employment and policies to ‘make work pay’ might be more effective in reducing
unemployment. 
Secondly, as our dataset has information on all the applicants to the vacancy and not just
those who were successful, we can say something about the process by which employers make
hiring decisions. In particular, we are interested in the extent to which employers reject
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Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991), Blanchard and Diamond (1994), and van Ours and Ridder
(1995).  There is strong circumstantial evidence of this practice (eg Meager and Metcalf (1987,
1996)) but little in the way of more formal evidence.   
The plan of the paper is as follows.  In the next section, we describe the data.  We then
outline a framework for thinking about the process by which vacancies are filled and analyse the
determinants of the number and quality of applicants and the process by which the vacancies are
filled.  Finally, we present some evidence on the way in which employers choose from the pool
of job applicants.  
Because of the nature of the sample, our conclusions can have no pretence to generality.
In spite of this we think some of the findings are interesting and do contribute to our understanding
of the workings of low-wage labour markets.  Our main findings are that:
— the average number of applicants per vacancy is slightly under three;
— the number of applicants is influenced by the wage offered and non-wage
aspects of jobs like the location and accessibility of the workplace;
— employers are able to fill the vast majority of their vacancies suggesting that the
number of applicants plays a role only in widening the choice (and, hence, quality)
of applicants;
— job applicants who are not currently employed do appear to be at a
disadvantage in getting a job interview but, conditional on having made it to
interview, appear not to suffer any further disadvantage in getting a job offer.
1.  The Data
1.1 general
The data are drawn from a wider project on “Recruitment and Retention in Low-Wage Labour
Markets”.  The general aim of this project was to obtain high-quality information on workers in
low-wage sectors.  Five companies  agreed to participate in the study by providing administrative
data and also distributing and collecting questionnaires on various aspects of the company’s
activities.  The identity of the companies will be referred to here by their activity:  a restaurant,
a hotel, a leisure company, a supermarket and a low-wage manufacturing sector.
Obviously the companies were not chosen randomly and, given this fact, there might be
some concerns about their representativeness or motives.  Their interest in the project was due to
the fact that we could offer research that they generally did not have the resources to do (for
example, we could compare the company workforce to workers in its specific industry using the
Labour Force Survey).  Each company was provided with a report specific to it containing this
type of information but it was made clear that the academic output of the project would be as we
saw fit.
1.2 data description
This paper analyses the information on the recruitment process that was collected as part of the
project.  For each vacancy that occurred in each participating workplace in the sample period (the
Autumn of 1996), the responsible manager was asked to provide some general information about
it.  These “top-sheets” varied slightly from company to company (as they were tailored to the
specific structure of the company concerned) but generally provided information on the package
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date at which the vacancy occurred, the number of vacancies, the number of applicants, interviews
and offers, and the date on which it was filled.  This obviously requires some effort on the part of
the manager so we would not expect 100% compliance rates.  Table 1 shows the number of new
starts from the vacancy data compared to the number of new recruits in the sample period from the
administrative data.  For the branches that participated, the response rates are good but there were
a number of branches which did not co-operate at all.   
In addition, we asked the responsible manager to keep a record of each applicant for the
job, detailing the date he or she applied, some personal characteristics, the date of interview, the
date an offer was made, with reasons for rejection given at each stage.  Figure 1 provides a
stylised representation of the application process and the numbers of individuals at each stage.
In total, we have information on 122 vacancy events comprising 425 vacancies.  Because
Four of these did not provide any information beyond the barest description of the vacancy, they
are dropped from the sample for the analysis.  47% of the vacancy events are for a single worker
with a further 22% being for two workers though we do have one situation where the employer
sought to fill 16 vacancies.
1.3 characteristics of the vacancies
Table 2 provides summary statistics on the vacancies in our sample.  Managers were given an
option to report either a single starting wage or a maximum and a minimum.  Only 16 took this
latter course, the average gap between the maximum and minimum starting rates being 19%.  For
the analysis below we used a geometric average of the minimum and maximum starting wages as
a measure of the average and also include a dummy variable to denote whether there was variation
in the starting wage.  The average wage is £3.53 per hour which is somewhere between the
fifteenth and twentieth percentile in the overall wage distribution (using the LFS).
Average wages paid do not mean much without considering the alternatives that workers
might expect to get.  We have a number of sources of information on alternative wages.  First,
managers were asked to list up to five main competitors in the labour market and record the wage
that they paid.  We took the geometric average of these to compute a measure of competitors’
wages.  We also got estimates of average hourly wages in the company’s industry in the relevant
travel-to-work area from the New Earnings Survey.  Finally, we asked managers to state whether
they thought they paid above or below the going rate in their labour market.  These answers were
on a scale ranging from 1 (well below average) to 5 (well above average).
The answers from the self-reported wages, competitor wages and relative wage
performance are more or less consistent.  For example, Table 3 presents the wage relative to those
of the competitors for each of the wage performance categories:  the relative wage changes
monotonically in the direction we would expect.  The performance of the alternative wage derived
from the NES was less satisfactory.  The correlation between these measures of alternative wages
and those reported by the companies themselves was only 0.4.  Given that a relatively small set
of employers replied to the question about competitors’ wages, we use only the self-reported
relative wage performance in what follows.
We might be also concerned about the extent of exogenous variation in wages in our data.
Differences in the wage policies pursued by our companies can provide some reassurance on this.
Some of our companies operate a national pay policy with little or no regional variation in wages
while others leave pay determination entirely in the hands of local managers.  We can see the
consequences of this in our data.  The restaurant leaves pay policy in the hands of its local
managers, and the correlation of the self-reported relative pay measure and the average regional
4wage is 0.04.  On the other hand, the supermarket and the hotel chain both have a national pay
policy with limited regional variation so that their pay is relatively good in low-wage regions and
relatively bad in high-wage regions:  for the supermarket the correlation between relative pay and
the average regional wage is -0.9 while for the hotel it is -0.65.   
We also collected information on how long workers had to wait until they could expect a
rise in the wage and the size of the rise they might then expect to get.  On average workers could
expect to wait 21 weeks for a pay rise, which was then of the order of 6% (as one might expect
there is a negative correlation between the waiting period and the size of the rise).
It is possible that non-wage characteristics of the job are also important in determining the
attractiveness of jobs.  We have information on fringe benefits offered and on the location of the
workplace.  Table 2 reports the fraction of starters getting tips, bonuses and possibilities of
overtime.  Table 2 also reports the fraction of workplaces that are centrally located, accessible
by public transport or with transport provided by the company.  We also have some information
on the specific job for which the vacancy is being posted.  The majority of the vacancies are for
‘unskilled’ jobs where qualifications are not required but we have created a dummy variable
where specialist skills are needed:  only 8% of vacancies fall into this category.
1.4 recruitment methods
We also collected information on the recruitment methods used to fill vacancies.  We asked about
five different methods:  notifying the job centre, placing an advert in a local paper, using a private
employment agency, using existing workers and approaching workers already known to the
employer.  Approaches to existing staff and job centres are the most frequently used methods, and
a third use newspaper adverts and direct approaches to specific workers (Table 2).  Only a small
minority used a private employment agency:  this is an expensive option and not one used for most
of the relatively unskilled jobs that comprise the bulk of our sample.
1.5 outcomes
We are interested in the extent to which the characteristics of vacancies described above affect
the ability to fill vacancies and the time it takes to do so.  A natural first stage is to look at the
extent to which these factors affect the number and quality of applicants.  Table 2 summarises the
number of applicants and number of applicants per vacancy.  In general, the number of applicants
per vacancy is quite small, less than three.  This number could be compared to the 6.6 applicants
per opening that Holzer, Katz and Krueger (1991) report for low-wage jobs in the US.  Turning
to the next stage of the recruitment process, we present summary information on the number of
interviews and the number of offers made.  On average there are 1.4 interviews per vacancy and
0.86 offers.  This indicates that the employers are eventually managing to fill most of their
vacancies.
3 Gregg and Petrongolo (1997) use this framework to analyse the aggregate matching function for
the UK concluding that it does a better job in explaining the data than the traditional Diamond-
Pissarides specification.
4 The argument behind the derivation of (1) is presented in an Appendix.
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2.  Modelling Outcomes
2.1 the number of applicants
Perhaps the most commonly used framework  for thinking about the process of filling vacancies
is the matching approach pioneered by Diamond (1982) and Pissarides (1990).  In this approach
vacancies and workers wander around bumping into each other and forming a match if it is
mutually beneficial to do so.  If a match is not formed the pair are assumed to be unable to return
to each other (the assumption of no recall).
While this approach has generated very useful insights into the dynamics of unemployment
in the economy as a whole it may not be a very realistic description of the way in which vacancies
actually get filled.  Ridder and van Ours (1992,1993), using Dutch data, conclude that the duration
of vacancies are better modelled as an application period in which a number of applications flow
into the firm and a selection period when the employer picks the best from among the applicants.
They conclude that vacancy durations are determined more by the length of the selection process
than by the time it takes for applicants to contact the firm.  Van Ours and Ridder do not suggest an
explanation of why, immediately following the advertising of a vacancy, there is a very rapid flow
of applicants to the firm which then tails off.  One plausible explanation for this has been proposed
by Coles and Smith (1994).  They suggest that a more realistic view of the matching process is that
job-seekers are normally aware of where vacancies will be advertised (eg the job centre or local
newspapers) and that the posting of a vacancy will result in a very rapid inflow of applicants.  The
employer will then choose the most suitable from among this list:  if it fails to find anyone suitable
then it has to wait for an interested (and suitable) new job-seeker to see the vacancy3.  In this
framework the time to fill a vacancy is primarily determined by the time it takes to select a suitable
candidate.       
Consider how we might capture these ideas more formally.   Assume that, at any moment,
there is a pool of job-seekers who would be prepared to work for the firm and who would be
aware of a vacancy if it were advertised.  If there is no vacancy, then these individuals will have
no opportunity to get employment but, as soon as there is a vacancy, they will apply.  This pool
of potential applicants will not be constant:  individuals leave the pool because, for example, they
get a better job elsewhere or because their personal circumstances change.  Workers will enter
the pool for similar reasons.   At  any moment there will be a stock A of individuals who are
interested in the job and aware of it.  A will be a random variable:  let us denote the steady-state
probability that there are A individuals in the pool by fA.
To derive fA we need to make some assumption about the rate at which individuals enter
and leave the pool of interested and aware job-seekers.  Suppose that individuals join the pool of
potential applicants at a rate r and leave it at a rate d.  This problem is well-known in queuing
theory (see, for example, Gross and Harris, 1974) and the steady-state distribution of the number
of people in the pool, A, is given by a Poisson distribution of the form4:
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where µ=r/d.  The expected number of people in the pool is given by µ which is what we would
expect given that µ is the ratio of the arrival rate to the separation rate.  What factors would we
expect to determine µ?  It seems sensible to assume that it will be determined partly by the utility
offered by this job (which will have both monetary and non-monetary components) relative to what
is available in the rest of the labour market and factors which affect the awareness of the vacancy
to potential applicants.  These are the variables that we will attempt to use to explain the number
of applicants in the empirical analysis.  
Given the theoretical framework sketched above, the most appropriate statistical model
for the number of applicants would seem to be a Poisson regression model.  In this case we
operationalise (1) by assuming that:
where x is a set of relevant characteristics and e is an error.  It is convenient and standard to
assume that exp(e) has a gamma distribution.  It is then well-known that the distribution of the
number of applications will have a negative binomial distribution (for example see Greene, 1997,
p.940).  The Poisson model is a special case of this one but, in our data, the restriction implied
by the Poisson model is always very strongly rejected, so the results are not reported.  The results
of estimating this model for the number of applicants are presented in Table 4.
The first column presents a basic specification in which the wage offered is measured by
the self-assessed wage performance (assumed to be a cardinal measure).  Several findings stand
out.  First, the location of the firm is important in determining the number of applicants.
Workplaces with a central location or accessible by public transport have larger numbers of
applicants than those in less accessible locations.  Providing assistance with transport to work
does not seem to increase the number of applicants but it is likely that there is a serious
endogeneity problem here as only those establishments with particular problems in this area are
likely to provide this assistance.
Secondly, the wage offered relative to competitors does seem to increase the number of
applicants, though the estimated coefficient only has a t-statistic of 1.7.  Jobs that require specialist
skills attract significantly fewer applicants than others.  This is consistent with the finding that
vacancies for skilled workers are often harder to fill than those for less-skilled jobs.  The
recruitment methods do not seem to make much difference, there being only weak evidence that
advertising in a newspaper increases the number of job applicants.  Approaching individuals
known to the employer seems to be associated with having fewer applicants but this may be
because employers doing this are targeting specific individuals and do not make any attempt to
attract job applicants from a wider pool.
The second column presents a more parsimonious version of the first column with the
variables whose coefficients were insignificant at conventional levels being dropped.  One
variable not included in the original specification that does seem to be an important determinant
of the number of applicants is the number of vacancies.  The third column reports estimates of the
preferred specification which includes this variable.  It has little impact on the coefficients on the
other variables with the exception of the newspaper advertisement variable.  There are a number
of reasons why the number of vacancies might raise the number of job applicants.  First, a firm
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we might expect that our variables on recruitment methods would pick this up.  Secondly, it may
be that individuals are more likely to apply if they see that many jobs are being advertised.  There
is some cost (albeit small) involved in applying for a job, and it may be the case that some people
do not apply for jobs they think they have no chance of getting.
Columns 4-6 experiment with looking at the impact of the wage contract offered on the
number of applicants.  In the fourth column we break up the wage performance variable (which
is really only an ordinal measure) into dummy variables for paying above or below the average.
The estimated coefficients have the expected signs though those who pay above average do not
appear to have significantly higher numbers of applicants.  The fifth column includes a dummy
variable for whether there is any variation in the starting-wage:  vacancies where this is the case
do have significantly higher numbers of job applicants.  The sixth column includes other measures
of the wage package:  the availability of fringe benefits, the expected time to the first pay increase
and its expected size (note that the sample size falls as these variables are not available for all
vacancies).  None of these variables appears to have a significant influence on the number of job
applicants.
Columns 7-8 look at the determinants of the number of applicants who are currently
employed and those who are not currently employed.  Some of the results are similar:  wage
performance seems to have a similar impact, though the estimated coefficient is not significantly
different from zero in either equation.  But other results are rather different:  variation in wages,
the availability of public transport, a specialist job and the number of vacancies seem to have a
much larger effect on the number of non-employed job applicants, while a central location is more
important for employed applicants.       
Overall, how should these results inform one’s view of the way the labour market works?
They suggest that the terms and conditions offered have an important impact on the number of
applicants.  This seems to be the case both for applications from those currently in employment
and those currently out of work.  It is perhaps not so surprising that applications from employed
workers are influenced by the terms and conditions offered but the results for applications from
those out of work deserve more discussion.  The facts that these jobs attract relatively small
numbers of applicants and the number of applications are sensitive to wages offered suggest that
these jobs are not so much better than alternatives that all non-employed workers want all jobs.
This suggests that extreme notions of involuntary unemployment in which wages are above market-
clearing levels are not supported by the data.  One might be tempted to conclude that policies to
improve terms and conditions like a minimum wage will increase the number of applicants for
these jobs.  That might be the case (Holzer, Katz and Krueger, 1990, do present some US evidence
on this) but the overall effect on employment depends on whether the supply of vacancies increases
or decreases as a result, something on which our study can shed no light.  The finding that getting
to work is an important consideration is consistent with some other evidence.  For example,
Manning and Thomas (1997) find that the unemployed with access to motor transport are more
likely to get a job than others.  However, little attention is paid in the literature to these spatial
issues:  perhaps, they deserve further research.   
2.2 the quality of applicants
How do the variables we have used above influence the average quality of applicants?  We have
information on a number of applicant characteristics:  their sex, their age, whether they have
relevant experience, whether they are currently employed, and whether they have been previously
employed by the company.  Descriptive statistics on these variables are presented in Table 2.
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(eg sex) it is not clear.  We present evidence below about which characteristics employers seem
to prefer in selecting applicants for interview:  we can then use a revealed preference argument
to say which characteristics the employer seem to value.  
The results of models for the proportion of applicants with different characteristics are
given in Table 5.  The most striking feature of these results is the lack of any systematic influence
of any of the explanatory variables:  the characteristics of applicants do not seem to be very
sensitive to the characteristics of the vacancy.  
2.3 the number of interviews and offers
Table 6 looks at the determinants of the number of interviews conducted and job offers made.  In
modelling these outcomes we can use the same model as we used to model the number of
applicants (i.e. the model summarised in (1) and (2)) with A now referring not to the total number
of applicants but the number of applicants whom the employer wants to interview or to whom they
would like to make an offer. The first column includes the variables that were previously found
to be significant in the determination of the number of applicants.  The only explanatory variable
that is significant is the number of vacancies and this variable becomes more significant as we
change the dependent variable from interviews to offers.  The explanation is simple:  virtually all
of our sample eventually fill all their vacancies and the only impact of an increased applicant pool
is to give the employer a wider choice.  We do not have a large number of vacancies in which the
pool of applicants is so bad in the eyes of the employer that the job is left empty.
Columns 3 and 4 present a slightly different approach to the determinants of the number of
interviews and offers where we look at the choice conditional on the size and average quality of
the applicant pool.  The number (but not the quality) of applicants does seem to exert a significant
influence over the number of interviews, but a smaller influence over the number of offers.  The
number of vacancies is again the most important variable explaining the number of offers.
3.  The Selection Procedure 
In this section we present information on the way in which applicants are selected by employers
to fill vacancies.  The managers were asked to record, for each vacancy, basic information about
each applicant.  We are interested in how the characteristics of an applicant affect the chances of
being interviewed, and subsequently of being offered the job. 
The first column of Table 7 estimates a logit model to determine the effects of an
individual’s characteristics on the chance of getting an interview.  The model includes controls
for the company and the logs of the number of applicants and of the number of vacancies as it is
plausible that the chance of an interview depends on the number of vacancies relative to the
number of applicants.  The estimates suggest that age and sex are unimportant in determining the
chances of an interview (we did experiment with a non-linear functional form for age but found
no effect).  However previous relevant experience and being in employment are important in
determining the chances of an interview as (more marginally) is having previous experience in the
company.  The number of applicants and the number of vacancies also have a powerful impact on
the chances of being interviewed.  The fact that the coefficients on these variables are opposite in
sign and of very similar magnitude suggests that it is the ratio of the number of vacancies to the
number of applicants that is important.      
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of getting an interview.  We might therefore expect that it is not just one’s personal characteristics
that are important in securing an interview but characteristics relative to those of other applicants.
The second column takes one approach to this, by including a fixed effect for each vacancy event
(as the fixed effect is one way of controlling for the characteristics of the applicant pool).  The
sample size falls as the logit model cannot be estimated for those vacancies for which everyone
is interviewed.  The results confirm that those applicants currently employed and with relevant
experience are more likely to be offered an interview.  This fixed effect specification is rather
crude and expensive in terms of degrees of freedom, so the third column of Table 7 estimates a
more parsimonious specification in which the average characteristics of the applicant pool are
included as additional regressors.  These results confirm that being in employment, having relevant
experience and having previously worked for the company are important in determining the chance
of an interview.  In fact one can accept the hypothesis that the coefficients on the individual’s
characteristics are equal and opposite to those on the averages — these results are reported in the
fourth column.
The managers were also asked for the main reason for not interviewing individuals (Table
8).  The answers were not constrained so this table is the result of collating similar answers —
while there is an element of judgement in doing this, it has little impact on the general conclusions.
Lack of experience is the most commonly mentioned factor, followed by age, general impression
and attitude.  With the exception of age, this is in line with our earlier findings if it’s recognised
that general impression and attitude are correlated with current employment status. 
Not all applicants whom the employer wanted to interview actually turned up:  8% were
no-shows.  The fifth column of Table 7 considers the determinants of who did not show.  We
included only individual characteristics as it is not plausible that an individual applicant knows
the composition of the applicant pool (none of these variables is significant when included).  As
can be seen, none of the estimated coefficients is significantly different from zero, though those
currently in employment are marginally less likely to turn up.
Once the applicant has been interviewed, the employer needs to decide whether to make
an offer.  The sixth column of Table 7 presents the results of a logit model for whether the
employer makes an offer conditional on inviting to an interview and the worker turning up for it.
None of the characteristics’ variables are now significant, but the ratio of the number of applicants
to vacancies remains very important.  This remains true when we include the average
characteristics among those interviewed and the numbers interviewed, as reported in the seventh
column.  This suggests that, once an individual has got to an interview other factors, not well-
captured by our crude measures of personal characteristics, play the most important role in getting
an offer.  This is confirmed by the second column of Table 8, which shows that personal habits are
now more important, as are issues about the exact hours that the individual can work. 
These results suggest (perhaps unsurprisingly) that employers use ‘objective’ criteria like
experience, age and work history when selecting for interview but then rely more on their
impression of candidates.  Table 8 also shows that it is sometimes the case that the worker is
rejecting the employer, or that the worker and employer fail to find a  mutually acceptable match,
notably over hours worked.
4.  Conclusions
In this paper we have investigated the process by which vacancies are filled in relatively low-
wage segments of the British labour market.  The questions addressed in this paper have received
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little attention in the literature.  Our conclusions, necessarily tentative because they are based on
a small and specific dataset, are, therefore of some interest.
The main findings are that these vacancies have a relatively small number of applicants
(under three on average).  The number is influenced by the wage offered by the job and non-wage
aspects of the job, notably the location of the workplace.  However, virtually all the vacancies are
filled eventually so that the main impact of the number of applicants is that the employer has a
wider choice to choose the ‘best’ worker.  In selecting workers for interview, employers are likely
to reject those not currently in employment or lacking relevant work experience but, conditional
on being interviewed, such workers are not at any further disadvantage in the selection procedure.
In terms of our understanding of labour markets, these results suggest that these vacancies
are not overwhelmed with applicants. Models like efficiency wages which ‘explain’
unemployment in terms of wages being a long way above reservation wages may be rather wide
of the mark (though this should not be taken to mean that efficiency wages are irrelevant in all parts
of the labour market).  The results also suggest that employers do have the ability to influence the
number of applicants through the terms and conditions of employment.  
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Table 1
The Response Rate
company branch number of recruits
(payroll records)
number of offers
made in
vacancy sample
percentage
hotel 1 52 42 81
hotel 2 23 10 43
hotel 3 32 22 69
hotel 4 14 5 35
hotel 5 30 32 107
manufacturer 1 33 34 103
restaurant 1 12 11 92
restaurant 2 8 15 126
supermarket 1 77 31 40
supermarket 2 49 62 126
supermarket 3 11 11 100
supermarket 4 17 6 36
total 358 281 78
Notes: 1. There is no data for the leisure company and some branches of some others:  this is where the payroll
data was not provided.
2. The number of recruits is computed by taking all the recruits from the payroll data between the earliest
and latest dates mentioned in the vacancy statistics.  It is possible to  have a percentage more than 100%
because the start dates are not always reported in the vacancy data so could lie outside the sample period
from the payroll data.  In addition not all offers made are probably accepted.
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics
variable number of
observations
mean standard deviation
Characteristics of the Job
starting hourly wage 113 3.53 0.65
starting wages vary? 118 0.15 0.36
self-reported relative wage 118 3.04 1.03
wage below average 118 0.3 0.46
wage above average 118 0.27 0.45
weeks until pay increase 110 21.3 14.2
size of pay increase (%) 106 5.7 3.1
tips 105 0.43 0.5
bonuses 101 0.21 0.41
overtime available 99 0.73 0.45
central location 118 0.41 0.49
accessible by public transport 118 0.76 0.43
help with transport 118 0.3 0.46
specialist job 118 0.08 0.28
Recruitment Methods
job centre 117 0.59 0.49
newspaper advert 118 0.35 0.48
private agency 117 0.03 0.16
existing staff 117 0.61 0.49
direct approach 116 0.33 0.47
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Table 2 (continued)
Descriptive Statistics
variable number of observations mean standard deviation
Outcomes
number of vacancies 118 2.88 2.97
number of applicants 118 7.64 11.23
number of interviews 110 4.14 4.52
number of offers 116 2.49 3.08
Characteristics of Applicants
average age 660* 25.4 10.3
proportion female 660* 0.59 0.49
proportion
with experience
660* 0.42 0.49
proportion previously
worked for company
660* 0.07 0.25
proportion currently
in employment
660* 0.37 0.48
Notes: 1. An asterisk on the number of observations indicates that we are using data on individual job applicants.
The absence of an asterisk indicates that the variable refers to the number of vacancy events.
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Table 3
Correlations of Self-Reported and ‘Objective’ Relative Pay
reported competitor’s wage NES measure of alternative wage
self-reported
relative wage
log relative wage number of
observations
log relative wage number of
observations
lot above average 0.26
(0)
1 -0.36
(0)
1
above average 0.15
(0.25)
16 -0.26
(0.25)
36
average 0.01
(0.06)
24 -0.32
(0.18)
48
below average -0.01
(0.12)
20 -0.26
(0.15)
23
lot below average - 0 -0.38
(0)
12
Notes: 1. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Table 4:  Determinants of the Number of Applicants
dependent
variable
number of
applicants
number of
applicants
number of
applicants
number of
applicants
number of
applicants
number of
applicants
number of
employed
applicants
number of
unemployed
applicants
central
location
0.55
(0.32)
0.66
(0.27)
0.78
(0.22)
0.71
(0.31)
0.77
(0.21)
0.42
(0.35)
1.30
(0.39)
0.33
(0.27)
public
transport
1.12
(0.36)
0.92
(0.33)
0.55
(0.28)
0.61
(0.29)
0.83
(0.28)
0.77
(0.37)
-0.07
(0.80)
1.76
(0.50)
help with
transport
-0.01
(0.34)
wage
performance
0.38
(0.22)
0.50
(0.19)
0.35
(0.15)
0.25
(0.15)
0.36
(0.16)
0.18
(0.60)
0.22
(0.21)
wage above
average
0.28
(0.34)
wage below
average
-0.60
(0.33)
wages vary 0.70
(0.19)
0.77
(0.27)
0.07
(0.38)
1.07
(0.27)
fringe
benefits
-0.07
(0.27)
time to pay
increase
0.002
(0.010)
size of pay
increase
0.008
(0.06)
job centre 0.15
(0.24)
advert in
newspaper
0.41
(0.32)
0.37
(0.28)
-0.14
(0.17)
-0.07
(0.23)
-0.21
(0.23)
-0.42
(0.26)
-0.20
(0.44)
0.40
(0.35)
private
agency
-0.01
(0.60)
existing staff
notified
0.12
(0.29)
approach to
individuals
-0.39
(0.20)
-0.40
(0.19)
-0.35
(0.15)
-0.23
(0.17)
-0.15
(0.16)
-0.07
(0.17)
-0.04
(0.31)
-0.18
(0.21)
walk-ins -0.30
(0.24)
specialist
job
-0.70
(0.36)
-0.59
(0.32)
-0.32
(0.27)
-0.30
(0.27)
-0.33
(0.25)
-0.14
(0.30)
0.09
(0.40)
-1.03
(0.37)
ln(no of
vacancies)
0.67
(0.09)
0.66
(0.09)
0.66
(0.19)
0.54
(0.10)
0.25
(0.16)
0.83
(0.11)
number of
obs
116 116 116 116 116 86 100 100
ln(alpha) -0.70
(0.17)
-0.68
(0.17)
-1.29
(0.21)
-1.30
(0.21)
-1.54
(0.24)
-1.99
(0.39)
-0.37
(0.26)
-1.33
(0.31)
log
likelihood
-317.5 -318.7 -294.2 -294 -287.9 -192 -184 -208.3
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Notes 1. All the estimates refer to an estimate of the negative binomial model.  Each equation also includes a constant,
company and regional  dummies.  Standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 5
Determinants of the Quality of Applicants
dependent
variable
proportion
experienced
proportion
currently
employed
proportion
previously
employed in
company
proportion
female
average
age
central location 0.08
(0.11)
0.13
(0.11)
0.18
(0.08)
0.05
(0.13)
6.93
(3.42)
public transport 0.23
(0.17)
-0.15
(0.18)
-0.01
(0.10)
-0.48
(0.18)
-11.28
(4.75)
help with transport -0.13
(0.15)
-0.15
(0.20)
-0.16
(0.12)
-0.36
(0.16)
 0.31
(0.12)
wage performance -0.03
(0.07)
0.004
(0.09)
0.05
(0.07)
-0.08
(0.09)
-0.20
(0.10)
wages vary 0.23
(0.13)
-0.17
(0.14)
0.10
(0.06)
-0.21
(0.12)
-4.63
(2.39)
job centre -0.24
(0.09)
 0.04
(0.11)
-0.22
(0.08)
 0.03
(0.10)
-4.03
(2.12)
advert in newspaper 0.07
(0.13)
-0.12
(0.15)
-0.23
(0.08)
-0.16
(0.14)
-2.18
(3.38)
private agency -0.09
(0.18)
-0.30
(0.16)
 0.01
(0.12)
 0.01
(0.27)
 2.16
(3.81)
existing staff notified 0.004
(0.09)
-0.14
(0.10)
-0.05 
(0.07)
0.07
(0.14)
2.65
(3.37)
approach to individuals 0.02
(0.08)
0.02
(0.09)
0.08
(0.07)
-0.04
(0.10)
-2.51
(1.91)
walk-ins -0.10
(0.07)
0.07
(0.09)
-0.03
(0.04)
 0.01
(0.10)
-0.53
(2.32)
specialist job -0.70
(0.36)
 0.22
(0.16)
 0.11
(0.11)
 0.04
(0.16)
-0.34
(3.19)
ln(no of vacancies) -0.05
(0.05)
-0.13
(0.06)
-0.006
(0.02)
 0.09
(0.05)
-1.77
(0.94)
number of observations 100 100 100 100 100
R2 0.42 0.38 0.38 0.29 0.34
Notes 1. All the estimates refer to an estimate of a linear regression model.  Each equation also includes a
constant, company and regional  dummies.  Heteroscedastic-consistent standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 6
Determinants of the Number of Interviews and Offers
dependent variable number of
interviews
number of
offers
number
of
interview
s
number of
offers
central location 0.24
(0.20)
0.01
(0.25)
public transport 0.45
(0.26)
0.06
(0.29)
wage performance 0.09
(0.14)
-0.06
(0.16)
wages vary 0.19
(0.19)
0.24
(0.20)
advert in newspaper 0.43
(0.25)
0.20
(0.33)
approach to individuals -0.004
(0.14)
0.002
(0.16)
specialist job -0.12
(0.23)
-0.01
(0.30)
0.09
(0.21)
0.20
(0.29)
ln(no of vacancies) 0.59
(0.08)
0.96
(0.09)
0.31
(0.07)
0.83
(0.10)
ln( no of applications) 0.45
(0.07)
0.19
(0.09)
proportion of applicants
employed
0.08
(0.19)
-0.36
(0.24)
proportion of applicants
experienced
0.17
(0.19)
0.30
(0.24)
proportion of applicants
previous employee
-0.66
(0.32)
-0.06
(0.37)
proportion of applicants female 0.09
(0.15)
0.22
(0.20)
average age of applicants 0.0001
(0.007)
-0.005
(0.010)
number of observations 108 114 127 127
ln(alpha) -2.51
(0.47)
-14.11
(53.4)
-4.48
(2.30)
-17.6
(60.2)
log likelihood -214.5 -154.7 -239.7 -180.71
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Notes: 1. All the estimates refer to an estimate of the negative binomial model.  Each equation also includes a
constant, company and regional  dummies.  Standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 7
The Selection Process
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
dependent
variable
selected
for
interview
selected for
interview
selected
for
interview
selected
for
interview
turned up for
interview
offered job offered job
sample all
applicants
all
applicants
all
applicants
all
applicants
selected for
interview
all
interviewed
all
interviewed
age 0.002
(0.010)
0.012
(0.015)
0.011
(0.014)
-0.016
(0.020)
-0.012
(0.017)
-0.002
(0.018)
average age -0.009
(0.023)
0.034
(0.026)
0.014
(0.025)
female 0.045
(0.207)
-0.068
(0.283)
0.000
(0.256)
-0.384
(0.837)
-0.347
(0.349)
-0.423
(0.367)
proportion
female
0.097
(0.45
0.463
(0.527)
0.394
(0.507)
employed 0.426
(0.218)
0.796
(0.283)
0.581
(0.252)
0.570
(0.247)
0.859
(0.502)
-0.166
(0.308)
-0.304
(0.325)
proportion
employed
-0.268
(0.540)
-0.57 -0.848
(0.597)
-0.237
(0.583)
experienced 0.872
(0.225)
1.31
(0.282)
1.066
(0.253)
1.038
(0.247)
0.043
(0.458)
0.350
(0.315)
0.407
(0.337)
proportion
experienced
-0.806
(0.571)
-1.038 -0.362
(0.627)
-0.331
(0.582)
company
experience
0.666
(0.533)
1.928
(0.731)
1.369
(0.640)
1.364
(0.630)
see notes 0.475
(0.618)
0.132
(0.628)
proportion
with company
experience
-2.011
(0.967)
-1.364 0.098
(1.071)
0.757
(0.954)
ln(number of
applicants)
-1.042
(0.141)
-1.154
(0.154)
-1.128
(0.141)
-0.277
(0.263)
-1.03
(0.174)
-1.509
(0.222)
ln(number of
vacancies)
1.057
(0.165)
1.068
(0.171)
1.027
(0.161)
0.324
(0.305)
1.426
(0.204)
1.888
(0.248)
number of
observations
658 398 658 671 411 407 407
log-likelihood -309.8 -209.1 -305.1 -311.6 -89.7 -210 -204.9
Notes: 1. Standard errors in parentheses.
2. In column (5) there are no estimates for those who had previously worked for the company as all of these
workers were interviewed.
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 3. The difference between the sixth and seventh columns is that in the sixth column the average characteristics
refer to those of the applicant pool as a whole whereas in the seventh column it is the characteristics of those
interviewed.  The number of applicants in the final column is the number interviewed.
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Table 8
Reasons Given by Employers for Applicants Leaving Selection Process
Reason for Not Interviewing Reason for Rejecting After Interview
no. of observations percentage no. of observations percentage
lack of experience 41 23 22 13
age 26 14 3 2
bad work history 11 6 3 2
bad reference
or impression
22 12 61 35
poor health record 5 3 1 1
bad English 2 1 2 1
failed test set 23 12 0 0
lived too far away 4 2 0 0
better candidate - - 20 11
hours wanted
not possible
17 9 32 18
pay too low 5 3 8 5
got another job 2 1 6 3
worker not available 2 1 0 0
worker gets more
on benefit
0 0 0 0
insufficient info
on application
10 6 5 3
other 7 4 8 5
total 184 100 175 100
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Not Selected For Intewrview
(200)
Was Not Made Offer
(183)
Accepted Offer
(284)
Rejected Offer
(30)
Made Offer
(335)
Turned Up for Interview
(507)
Did Not Turn Up for Interview
(49)
Selected for Interview
(600)
Applicant Applies
(804)
Figure 1
Overview of the Recruitment Process
Notes. 1. The numbers in parentheses represent the number of applicants observed at each stage.  Where they
do not add up to the number listed at the previous stage is because of missing information for some
applicants.
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fA(t%?) ' (1&r?&Ad?)fA(t) % r?fA&1(t) % d(A%1)?fA%1(t) (3)
MfA(t)
Mt
' &(r%Ad)fA(t) % rfA&1(t) % d(A%1)fA%1(t) (4)
(r%Ad)fA ' rfA&1 % d(A%1)fA%1 (5)
(µ%A)fA ' µfA&1 % (A%1)fA%1 (6)
j
4
A'0
fA ' kj
4
A'0
µA
A!
' 1 (7)
Appendix 
Derivation of Equation (1)
Consider a short interval of time ? , short enough for the probability of more than one individual
leaving or joining the pool to be negligible (technically o(? )).  Denote by fA(t) the probability of
having A potential applicants in the pool at time t.  We must have:
Now let ?60 in which case (3) can be written as:
In a steady-state fA(t) must be constant in which case we have:
which can be interpreted as saying that inflows must equal outflows.  Using the definition that
r=µd, we can write (5) as:
By substitution one can confirm that the solution to this difference equation must be of the form
fA=kµA/A! for some constant k.  The constant k can then be deduced by the fact that, as fA is a
density function we must have:
which leads to k=e-µ.  This gives (1).
23
References
Barron, J. and  J. Bishop (1985) “Extensive Search, Intensive Search and Hiring Costs:  New
Evidence on Employer Hiring Activity”, Economic Inquiry, Vol.23, pp.363-382.
Barron, J., J. Bishop and W. Dunkelberg (1985) “Employer Search:  The Interviewing and Hiring
of New Employees”, Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol.67, pp.43-52.
Beaumont, P. (1978) “The Duration of Registered Vacancies:  An Exploratory Exercise”, Scottish
Journal of Political Economy, Vol.25, pp.75-97.
Blanchard, O. and P. Diamond (1994) “Ranking, Unemployment Duration, and Wages”, Review
of Economic Studies, Vol.61, pp.417-34.
Coles, M. and E. Smith  (1994) “Marketplaces and Matching”, CEPR Discussion Paper No.1048.
Devine, T. and N. Kiefer (1991) Empirical Labor Economics:  The Search Approach, New York:
Oxford University Press.
Diamond, P. (1982) “Aggregate Demand Management in Search Equilibrium”, Journal of Political
Economy, Vol.90, pp.881-94.
Greene, W. (1997) “Econometric Analysis”, London:  Prentice-Hall.
Gregg, P. and B. Petrongolo (1997) “Random or Non-Random Matching? Implications for the Use
of the UV Curve as a Measure of Matching Effectiveness”, Centre for Economic
Performance Discussion Paper No.348, London School of Economics.
Gregg, P. and J. Wadsworth (1996) “Mind the Gap Please? The Changing Nature of Entry Jobs
in Britain”, Centre for Economic Performance Discussion Paper 303, London School of
Economics.
Gregory, M. and R. Jukes (1997) “The Effects of Unemployment on Subsequent Earnings:  A Study
of British Men, 1984-94”, Department for Education and Employment Working Paper.
 
Gross, D. and C. Harris (1974) Fundamentals of Queueing Theory, New York:  John Wiley. 
Holzer, H. (1994) “Job Vacancy Rates in the Firm:  An Empirical Analysis”, Economica, Vol.61,
pp.17-36.
Holzer, H., L. Katz and A. Krueger (1991) “Job Queues and Wages”, Quarterly Journal of
Economics, Vol.106, pp.739-768.
Layard, R., S. Nickell and R. Jackman (1991) Unemployment:   Macroeconomic Performance
and the Labour Market,  Oxford:  Oxford University Press.
24
Manning, A. and J. Thomas (1997) “A Simple Test of the Shirking Model”, Centre for Economic
Performance Discussion Paper No. 374, London School of Economics.
 
Meager, N. And H. Metcalf  (1987) Recruitment of the Long Term Unemployed, Institute of
Manpower Studies:  Brighton.
Meager, N. and H. Metcalf (1996) Employers, Recruitment and the Unemployed, Institute of
Manpower Studies:  Brighton.
National Bureau of Economic Research (1966) The Measurement and Interpretation of Job
Vacancies, New York:  Columbia University Press.
Pissarides, C. (1990) Equilibrium Unemployment Theory Oxford:  Blackwell.
Roper, S. (1988) “Recruitment Methods and Vacancy Duration”, Scottish Journal of Political
Economy, Vol.35, pp.51-64. 
van Ours, J. (1989) “Durations of Dutch Job Vacancies”, de Economist, Vol.137, pp.309-327.
van Ours, J. and G. Ridder (1992) “Vacancies and the Recruitment of New Employees”, Journal
of Labor Economics, Vol.10, pp.138-155.
van Ours, J. and G. Ridder (1993) “Vacancy Durations:  Search or Selection”, Oxford Bulletin of
Economics and Statistics, Vol.55, pp.187-198.
van Ours, J. and G. Ridder (1995)  “Job Matching and Job Competition:  Are Lower Educated
Workers at the Back of Job Queues?”, European Economic Review; Vol.39, pp.1717-31.
